08 c6 3a 0c 76 a9 67 f2 d4。 Netgear TLS Private Key Disclosure through Device Firmware Images · GitHub

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08 c6 3a 0c 76 a9 67 f2 d4

Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure Overview There are at least two valid, signed TLS certificates that are bundled with publicly available Netgear device firmware. These certificates are trusted by browsers on all platforms, but will surely be added to revocation lists shortly. The firmware images that contained these certificates along with their private keys were publicly available for download through Netgear's support website, without authentication; thus anyone in the world could have retrieved these keys. routerlogin. net Both keys found were contained in the R9000-V1. downloads. netgear. entrust. routerlogin. net Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public-Key: 2048 bit Modulus: 00:c9:6d:0a:79:c9:ca:64:cd:ea:f0:ac:f4:bf:f6: 37:2b:1b:5a:f9:2c:10:52:d6:ee:4e:21:d3:00:2b: 18:fd:08:a0:6b:92:26:86:40:26:ef:f3:b7:dc:4d: 63:b8:04:0e:a0:78:bc:87:4e:50:d6:2d:3c:d4:f1: ed:b8:10:9c:bf:e7:eb:59:a9:19:4d:f7:dc:73:9d: b0:13:0a:29:41:4e:47:25:25:11:18:64:83:67:bd: 77:6d:22:b3:1f:df:db:29:09:20:d9:a1:3f:67:95: 83:ce:7e:02:c8:6f:46:46:f5:60:1b:75:30:8a:dc: c4:a0:e6:e3:97:e0:f5:d7:ce:15:21:2d:26:c2:ef: 66:a6:79:bf:ac:28:af:e2:d4:7f:6e:8d:31:a5:07: fa:c6:e2:91:cc:b0:cf:c8:27:4c:f1:8d:d8:14:8b: ca:d5:c7:2b:10:72:12:66:63:46:02:1b:f2:ab:8a: a2:1c:18:39:1f:4c:ed:a9:ca:ed:e7:05:96:a6:6a: a0:ab:76:bd:68:c6:ee:43:4d:e4:51:ce:79:a3:0b: 81:7c:ea:67:87:75:03:25:ee:5f:f9:67:d7:12:a8: 76:c5:a3:37:35:5f:d1:61:26:ab:9a:f3:b3:7d:4d: d1:24:73:ed:d7:74:3e:e8:b9:d5:4e:d7:9f:b5:f2: 46:c5 Exponent: 65537 0x10001 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:www. routerlogin. net, DNS:routerlogin. net, DNS:www. routerlogin. com, DNS:routerlogin. com CT Precertificate SCTs: Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 55:81:D4:C2:16:90:36:01:4A:EA:0B:9B:57:3C:53:F0: C0:E4:38:78:70:25:08:17:2F:A3:AA:1D:07:13:D3:0C Timestamp : May 1 00:53:53. 294 2019 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:44:02:20:0B:F3:9B:CB:60:8F:CE:00:51:E5:BE:2A: 61:21:2D:F6:4A:4F:AE:A8:B6:86:6D:D4:3F:30:1B:93: 42:C5:F5:B0:02:20:24:62:CD:72:37:EF:B9:D9:25:DF: 28:BC:56:E3:79:B2:21:14:58:2B:4B:05:78:D2:69:66: 8E:89:1A:65:32:4C Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 87:75:BF:E7:59:7C:F8:8C:43:99:5F:BD:F3:6E:FF:56: 8D:47:56:36:FF:4A:B5:60:C1:B4:EA:FF:5E:A0:83:0F Timestamp : May 1 00:53:53. 333 2019 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:44:02:20:16:80:A7:86:0B:EA:DD:3F:0A:6B:5D:10: 1E:C3:E2:8A:92:F7:6F:28:85:9D:64:FA:CF:24:F8:02: C5:A5:15:0C:02:20:34:D0:90:D7:4C:6D:14:56:49:5C: DC:A6:B1:18:BC:29:32:F0:37:0A:B7:A9:5F:43:37:DC: B2:F2:A4:FA:FA:AA Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 56:14:06:9A:2F:D7:C2:EC:D3:F5:E1:BD:44:B2:3E:C7: 46:76:B9:BC:99:11:5C:C0:EF:94:98:55:D6:89:D0:DD Timestamp : May 1 00:53:53. 346 2019 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:21:00:86:C3:D7:ED:C6:80:41:33:FC:6F:8F: 36:00:67:BB:58:F4:52:85:D7:1F:EF:46:E5:E1:1C:1F: 55:40:75:EC:DB:02:20:4B:2A:41:34:4D:5E:FD:FA:87: C5:E8:A1:26:9C:EF:DE:BA:09:7A:24:6D:8E:2A:46:6F: 12:EB:4B:DE:A4:5E:62 Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : F6:5C:94:2F:D1:77:30:22:14:54:18:08:30:94:56:8E: E3:4D:13:19:33:BF:DF:0C:2F:20:0B:CC:4E:F1:64:E3 Timestamp : May 1 00:53:53. entrust. crl X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2. 840. 114028. entrust. 140. entrust. entrust. cer X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:82:A2:70:74:DD:BC:53:3F:CF:7B:D4:F7:CD:7F:A7:60:C6:0A:4C:BF X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 5D:17:F2:BC:F7:B8:2D:0B:B8:4C:E8:EA:A2:79:E9:10:65:29:62:9D X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 21:36:ac:a8:3a:e8:47:17:90:dd:d8:5c:e0:27:78:f1:d6:f9: b8:94:29:64:76:8f:79:4c:51:7b:c6:2c:e7:78:4f:6c:c3:3c: 18:55:3e:48:ba:0d:65:2f:5c:0c:7a:8c:8b:cd:7e:d9:fc:e3: 89:54:07:41:2c:e9:f6:7f:bc:eb:22:e0:45:20:5c:5b:1d:87: 9c:19:38:76:fd:65:67:57:43:8e:eb:5d:1d:4e:81:bd:7e:53: 0a:7b:85:aa:13:ba:7e:bc:eb:87:2d:51:44:3e:5b:54:71:82: b0:a4:69:4a:7d:f9:ea:df:51:f2:f8:53:a8:5c:6e:34:71:8c: 1d:d5:16:57:cc:80:37:4d:2c:8d:5c:79:2d:4e:22:d0:ef:42: ea:f9:21:4f:e9:b2:95:1a:4d:cc:0c:e2:87:2c:a4:1a:ed:a0: 55:0f:52:0c:24:b3:dc:1e:fd:f8:cf:df:91:3c:98:a7:8f:9f: e6:da:92:f7:13:d4:91:c2:cb:0a:40:12:fa:a0:db:57:4c:30: ae:65:47:5a:25:a5:40:7c:98:1e:2d:51:40:82:cc:5d:5c:34: d1:01:8d:e3:29:55:b1:f5:59:59:7c:55:72:e2:59:99:87:64: 3d:2b:9f:56:e9:53:13:73:af:ab:4c:e1:d8:26:be:73:7c:78: d7:0a:12:42 According to the above output, this certificate, which is signed by EnTrust, is valid for the following DNS host names:• routerlogin. net• routerlogin. key in the aforementioned firmware image. mini-app. funjsq. com In the same firmware image was an additional valid TLS Certificate and its corresponding private key. pem. funjsq. com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public-Key: 2048 bit Modulus: 00:cc:57:d5:45:ad:bd:60:c8:af:6f:50:97:ef:df: 67:b0:1d:69:1d:a3:75:e9:ba:08:8d:4c:54:2e:b6: 83:1c:2e:e1:1f:66:0c:fb:7a:d0:9a:ce:52:a4:3f: 75:70:f4:39:73:f3:f5:86:2e:96:59:e6:a5:54:62: 17:52:15:ad:6f:22:bd:7d:84:36:14:7a:3b:1c:60: 61:7a:7d:86:d8:e2:99:49:d4:06:e9:7a:00:f2:43: f9:11:87:06:c8:20:0e:fc:15:51:bb:13:9d:ed:27: 39:df:cd:ec:46:6f:ed:a7:56:4f:71:a3:46:d7:25: f2:5a:38:a9:23:a1:89:0e:6e:f1:3d:6b:04:05:0e: 8b:32:bc:f1:1c:0e:f8:6c:95:e2:cd:6c:38:1a:e6: a6:3f:3b:22:41:f7:23:45:36:82:58:3c:a5:89:aa: 6e:16:e0:32:c2:38:a8:42:ba:de:ae:b4:03:f3:0b: a4:9e:6b:a6:31:68:14:da:20:93:aa:a7:a7:49:f4: 6d:3e:c8:39:72:e1:62:35:cc:67:3f:08:2e:ae:8b: ac:fc:14:3b:9d:b8:c7:5b:9b:db:08:3a:2b:98:aa: 0e:3e:92:5c:e7:e6:db:13:bb:47:e0:3b:3d:60:e5: f3:22:e8:8f:01:04:cf:e3:c3:fc:7e:e2:6c:23:2c: 48:17 Exponent: 65537 0x10001 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:90:AF:6A:3A:94:5A:0B:D8:90:EA:12:56:73:DF:43:B4:3A:28:DA:E7 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 27:B5:A2:32:E3:84:92:C6:D3:38:A3:83:6A:61:B2:C0:E7:43:53:1D X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 1. 6449. comodo. 140. comodoca. comodoca. comodoca. com X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:mini-app. funjsq. com, DNS:www. mini-app. funjsq. com CT Precertificate SCTs: Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : EE:4B:BD:B7:75:CE:60:BA:E1:42:69:1F:AB:E1:9E:66: A3:0F:7E:5F:B0:72:D8:83:00:C4:7B:89:7A:A8:FD:CB Timestamp : Jul 26 14:44:17. 854 2018 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:46:02:21:00:94:5A:FE:A8:70:93:59:E5:0A:F1:B5: 29:FE:2E:0D:91:34:D5:A8:A9:1D:C1:63:77:16:F3:75: 67:16:6C:25:33:02:21:00:93:66:BA:D6:27:57:D8:59: A5:C7:73:87:23:AB:F9:84:D9:DD:BA:50:A7:FC:5E:8E: 40:74:A0:DD:9C:BA:CF:BD Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 5E:A7:73:F9:DF:56:C0:E7:B5:36:48:7D:D0:49:E0:32: 7A:91:9A:0C:84:A1:12:12:84:18:75:96:81:71:45:58 Timestamp : Jul 26 14:44:18. 391 2018 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:21:00:F1:07:91:63:03:B7:51:60:5F:ED:FD: 72:43:E7:8F:98:34:A8:9E:85:CF:C1:33:AB:AF:7C:C1: B3:16:75:A8:79:02:20:30:F7:DB:8E:C7:D3:9F:86:42: 80:B7:C6:6B:0D:D5:14:85:99:BC:3F:99:79:D3:43:24: 3C:17:4F:2E:BE:A6:6A Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 55:81:D4:C2:16:90:36:01:4A:EA:0B:9B:57:3C:53:F0: C0:E4:38:78:70:25:08:17:2F:A3:AA:1D:07:13:D3:0C Timestamp : Jul 26 14:44:17. funjsq. com. Rationale for Full Disclosure We are aware that Netgear has public bug bounty programs. However, at current date those programs do not allow public disclosure under any circumstances. We as researchers felt that the public should know about these certificate leaks in order to adequately protect themselves and that the certificates in question should be revoked so that major browsers do not trust them any longer. We could not guarantee either if we had used the existing bug bounty programs. Disclosure Timeline• Tuesday, January 14th 2020 - Initial Discovery• Tuesday, January 14 2020 - Tweet sent attempting to establish communications with Netgear• Wednesday, January 15 2020 - Reached out to Bugcrowd to attempt to establish communications. Thursday, January 16 - Bugcrowd responds, but we are unable to establish a communications channel outside of the Netgear bug bounty programs. Friday, Jaunary 17th - Conversation with bugcrowd proves inconclusive• Sunday, January 19th - Feeling we have exhausted our disclosure avenues, we decide to publish Credits• Tom Pohl tompohl• Nick Starke nstarke Well done, and thanks for sharing your research! Even though some people on HN are critical about going full disclosure on this one, I think it is up to you guys to decide on how to proceed with such a finding. Netgear seems to lack proper opsec when not one but two private key files are included in the public firmware release. This seems deliberate, so that the routers can serve their internal configuration page from over HTTPS without having browsers show a self-signed certificate error. Sure, exposing the certificate makes HTTPS worthless for the domain, but so does using a self-signed certificate, and it's better than using plaintext HTTP for the configuration page, which so many vendors do. This seems deliberate, so that the routers can serve their internal configuration page from over HTTPS without having browsers show a self-signed certificate error. Sure, exposing the certificate makes HTTPS worthless for the domain, but so does using a self-signed certificate, and it's better than using plaintext HTTP for the configuration page, which so many vendors do. That's a plausible explanation. I totally forgot to think about this aspect. However, Netgear's attempt at HTTPS is going into the direction of "security by obscurity".. It would probably be wise to report this to mozilla. dev. security. policy as well, for the browser community to evaluate the conduct of the CA in issuing this certificate and possible ways to avoid such issues recurring. How is it the problem of any CA? They have nothing to do with irresponsible vendors publishing private keys. As long as they don't refuse to revoke it all is fine. This seems deliberate, so that the routers can serve their internal configuration page from over HTTPS without having browsers show a self-signed certificate error. Sure, exposing the certificate makes HTTPS worthless for the domain, but so does using a self-signed certificate, and it's better than using plaintext HTTP for the configuration page, which so many vendors do. Correct me if I'm wrong. But a self-signed certificate where the private key is not known is definitely better for security than a signed certificate with a known private key. This is just as worthless as using HTTP. I think it's even worse, because users see the green lock in the address bar and think they have a secure connection but in reality their traffic can be decrypted by everyone. This is obviously for the router config page. Unfortunately, doing this is a violation of the WebPKI rules, and thus full disclosure was a reasonable action here; the right thing to do is to simultaneously notify the issuing CA so that the certificate is revoked in the next 24h. I get what Netgear was trying to do here, but it doesn't work. Router configuration pages are outside the scope of HTTPS browser trust, because you need internet access to get any sort of personalized certificate e. Let's Encrypt , and you need to be able to configure your router before you have internet access. There's no solution here other than using unencrypted HTTP for initial setup or dealing with security warnings. Vendors have tried this stuff time and time again, and they just get their certificates revoked. It would be nice if we had a solution for encrypt-only no trust HTTP, but the browsers have collectively decided that's a bad idea. So here we are. Sucks to be Netgear. It would probably be wise to report this to mozilla. dev. security. policy as well, for the browser community to evaluate the conduct of the CA in issuing this certificate and possible ways to avoid such issues recurring. How is it the problem of any CA? They have nothing to do with irresponsible vendors publishing private keys. As long as they don't refuse to revoke it all is fine. Web browser vendors and others can apply pressure onto CAs to comply by threat to not trust them any longer but they cannot apply pressure onto the certificate owners, i. However the CAs can apply pressure onto their customers through their service contracts as well as refusal of service. It's better than HTTP because it requires active MitM It's worse than HTTP because it gives the user a false sense of security. Thanks for sharing : Correct me if I'm wrong. But a self-signed certificate where the private key is not known is definitely better for security than a signed certificate with a known private key. Unfortunately you are very wrong here: Self-signed certs train the user in a wrong direction. They will highly likely accept rouge certs for other services like bank https , too. That is why every browser vendor played whack-a-mole changing the dialog s for accepting these certs and made them look really scary. It's a solution to an unsolved problem... It is NOT a solution, it is a very bad hack. There's no solution here other than using unencrypted HTTP for initial setup or dealing with security warnings. Vendors have tried this stuff time and time again, and they just get their certificates revoked. That is not exactly true: If you throw enough money at the problem, there will be a solution. In this case, have the router https page under an individual URL like. routerlogin. net and ship each device with its own cert and key for this url only. It's better than HTTP because it requires active MitM It's worse than HTTP because it gives the user a false sense of security. Thanks for sharing : This is the best explainaition of this complicated topic i have ever read. How can embedded device manufacturers provide browser based configuration without scaring away users? They are not the only vendor doing this. By embedding a device-specific directly in the hardware and shipping a matching certificate. But that would increase the cost and therefore most vendors are not willing to do it. This can be used when securing access to configuration files for network deployment, e. to not leak the SIP passwords. Works the other way around too, only downside is that the certificate itself needs to have a life time matching the hardware. How can embedded device manufacturers provide browser based configuration without scaring away users? Have each device use a unique certificate and keys. Ideally, the device will generate and store the private key in a piece of protected hardware which will allow for the device to generate a certificate signing request which the manufacturer can then sign and push back into the device on the assembly line. Then, when a new firmware comes out, it doesn't have any keys in it, the keys are already in each device secured in a hardware "vault. Because each device has a unique set of keys and certificate, the manufacturer can verify that the device which is making the new certificate signing request over the Internet is the same one which they signed on the manufacturing line, and so can sign this new request too. Some privacy or manufacturer expected life concerns may arise here. In Netgear's case, it seems like their router needs to be your DNS server when you connect, so that they can use the routerlogin. net name in their certificate. For devices which will be accessed using a name which the device doesn't know at manufacturing time, then a slightly different procedure may be needed, although the device likely can reach the Internet most of the time if it is a non-router consumer network device, so could simply figure out what name the customer will access it by and perform the certificate signing request as above during setup rather than waiting until the original cert expires. There's no need to ruminate over how to solve this problem. It's fairly straightforward. From Things to do instead of shipping TLS certs and static private keys to consumer-grade routers you sell by the thousand:• Generate a unique keypair per device. Use this keypair to communicate upstream, in a similar fashion to CloudFlare's Keyless SSL. Profit! This keypair you generate on the device would need to be preloaded at the factory, unique per device, and the public key would need to be stored in a database. When a TLS handshake comes in, you verify the entire request is signed by that keypair before signing it. Delegated online signing for a TLS handshake isn't even in the top 10 engineering challenges for cryptography in the 2020s. Oh, and, if you don't have connectivity to upstream and your need users to connect to configure something? These are solved problems. Netgear just has to care about implementing the solutions. They don't care. In addition to what was already said, CAs are stewards of the public trust and have invested substantial time and resources - including in legal threats against browsers - to try and keep it that way. Incidents like this are clear and objective evidence they are poor stewards undeserving of that trust. There's no need to ruminate over how to solve this problem. It's fairly straightforward. It is not that straightforward. Using a router as wireless access point without network access is a perfectly reasonable use case. Heck, on first use Internet access is often not available because the router hasn't been configured appropriately yet. As so often, the devil is in the details. Just shipping a 2k RSA certificate with 10a life time per device can't be that costly though. It is a bug because they aren't allowed to do this per the WebPKI requirements, and their CA must and will revoke the certificate now, which means the feature will stop working. It doesn't matter whether you think the way the feature works is acceptable; the rules are the rules and as soon as they get caught doing this, as they have now, the certificate will be revoked, so they can't do this unless they want to have features that only work until someone discovers how they work. In defence of netgear: You failed to determine the use case and problem: The "URL" used here is a pseudo-URL used to configure a router. While Netgear owns the actual domain, nothing is there and you are redirected to Netgear instead. For configuring the router you may assume that there is NO way to connect to the internet at the point where the user connects to this pseudo-URL with content served by the router. Browsers like Chrome have chosen to show scary warning signs if a website is used which does not use HTTPS. provides good reasoning: Avoid users calling support over this expected non-issue. So "Use this keypair to communicate upstream" is not possible, and "generate a new private key and signing request and send it over the Internet" is similarly not possible. Having a router specific certificate incurs high cost and certificates expire. So not a solution either. The proper solution is what Verizon does. They have every gateway use a self-signed certificate. When you go to the IP address with http, it shows a message warning you that it will redirect to https and you will get a certificate error. If you don't understand that, you probably shouldn't be accessing the router interface. It seems Netgear is already patching this stuff out of some of their devices. In this firmware it's self-signed and in its predecessor it's an Entrust certificate which is expired by now. In the release notes of 2. " In my opinion Netgear was very well aware of this screw-up prior to this bug report.

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08 c6 3a 0c 76 a9 67 f2 d4

The list of CAs are trusted solely at Google's discretion and Google retains the right to remove root CAs at will, with or without reason. Important: At least one intermediate CA certificate must be present in the chain. That is, the root must not issue end-entity certificates directly. Chambers of Commerce Root 0C:25:8A:12:A5:67:4A:EF:25:F2:8B:A7:DC:FA:EC:EE:A3:48:E5:41:E6:F5:CC:4E:E6:3B:71:B3:61:60:6A:C3• Chambers of Commerce Root - 2008 06:3E:4A:FA:C4:91:DF:D3:32:F3:08:9B:85:42:E9:46:17:D8:93:D7:FE:94:4E:10:A7:93:7E:E2:9D:96:93:C0• Global Chambersign Root EF:3C:B4:17:FC:8E:BF:6F:97:87:6C:9E:4E:CE:39:DE:1E:A5:FE:64:91:41:D1:02:8B:7D:11:C0:B2:29:8C:ED• Global Chambersign Root - 2008 13:63:35:43:93:34:A7:69:80:16:A0:D3:24:DE:72:28:4E:07:9D:7B:52:20:BB:8F:BD:74:78:16:EE:BE:BA:CA Actalis Actalis Authentication Root CA 55:92:60:84:EC:96:3A:64:B9:6E:2A:BE:01:CE:0B:A8:6A:64:FB:FE:BC:C7:AA:B5:AF:C1:55:B3:7F:D7:60:66 Amazon• Amazon Root CA 3 18:CE:6C:FE:7B:F1:4E:60:B2:E3:47:B8:DF:E8:68:CB:31:D0:2E:BB:3A:DA:27:15:69:F5:03:43:B4:6D:B3:A4• Amazon Root CA 2 1B:A5:B2:AA:8C:65:40:1A:82:96:01:18:F8:0B:EC:4F:62:30:4D:83:CE:C4:71:3A:19:C3:9C:01:1E:A4:6D:B4• Amazon Root CA 1 8E:CD:E6:88:4F:3D:87:B1:12:5B:A3:1A:C3:FC:B1:3D:70:16:DE:7F:57:CC:90:4F:E1:CB:97:C6:AE:98:19:6E• Amazon Root CA 4 E3:5D:28:41:9E:D0:20:25:CF:A6:90:38:CD:62:39:62:45:8D:A5:C6:95:FB:DE:A3:C2:2B:0B:FB:25:89:70:92 Asseco Data Systems S. previously Unizeto Certum• Certum Trusted Network CA 2 B6:76:F2:ED:DA:E8:77:5C:D3:6C:B0:F6:3C:D1:D4:60:39:61:F4:9E:62:65:BA:01:3A:2F:03:07:B6:D0:B8:04• Certum CA D8:E0:FE:BC:1D:B2:E3:8D:00:94:0F:37:D2:7D:41:34:4D:99:3E:73:4B:99:D5:65:6D:97:78:D4:D8:14:36:24• Certum Trusted Network CA 5C:58:46:8D:55:F5:8E:49:7E:74:39:82:D2:B5:00:10:B6:D1:65:37:4A:CF:83:A7:D4:A3:2D:B7:68:C4:40:8E Atos Atos TrustedRoot 2011 F3:56:BE:A2:44:B7:A9:1E:B3:5D:53:CA:9A:D7:86:4A:CE:01:8E:2D:35:D5:F8:F9:6D:DF:68:A6:F4:1A:A4:74 Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068 04:04:80:28:BF:1F:28:64:D4:8F:9A:D4:D8:32:94:36:6A:82:88:56:55:3F:3B:14:30:3F:90:14:7F:5D:40:EF CA Disig a. A6:C5:1E:0D:A5:CA:0A:93:09:D2:E4:C0:E4:0C:2A:F9:10:7A:AE:82:03:85:7F:E1:98:E3:E7:69:E3:43:08:5C certSIGN certSIGN ROOT CA EA:A9:62:C4:FA:4A:6B:AF:EB:E4:15:19:6D:35:1C:CD:88:8D:4F:53:F3:FA:8A:E6:D7:C4:66:A9:4E:60:42:BB Chunghwa Telecom Corporation Chunghwa Telecom Co. , Ltd. - ePKI Root Certification Authority C0:A6:F4:DC:63:A2:4B:FD:CF:54:EF:2A:6A:08:2A:0A:72:DE:35:80:3E:2F:F5:FF:52:7A:E5:D8:72:06:DF:D5 Comodo• COMODO RSA Certification Authority 52:F0:E1:C4:E5:8E:C6:29:29:1B:60:31:7F:07:46:71:B8:5D:7E:A8:0D:5B:07:27:34:63:53:4B:32:B4:02:34• USERTrust ECC Certification Authority 4F:F4:60:D5:4B:9C:86:DA:BF:BC:FC:57:12:E0:40:0D:2B:ED:3F:BC:4D:4F:BD:AA:86:E0:6A:DC:D2:A9:AD:7A• USERTrust RSA Certification Authority E7:93:C9:B0:2F:D8:AA:13:E2:1C:31:22:8A:CC:B0:81:19:64:3B:74:9C:89:89:64:B1:74:6D:46:C3:D4:CB:D2• COMODO Certification Authority 0C:2C:D6:3D:F7:80:6F:A3:99:ED:E8:09:11:6B:57:5B:F8:79:89:F0:65:18:F9:80:8C:86:05:03:17:8B:AF:66• COMODO ECC Certification Authority 17:93:92:7A:06:14:54:97:89:AD:CE:2F:8F:34:F7:F0:B6:6D:0F:3A:E3:A3:B8:4D:21:EC:15:DB:BA:4F:AD:C7• AAA Certificate Services D7:A7:A0:FB:5D:7E:27:31:D7:71:E9:48:4E:BC:DE:F7:1D:5F:0C:3E:0A:29:48:78:2B:C8:3E:E0:EA:69:9E:F4• AddTrust External CA Root 68:7F:A4:51:38:22:78:FF:F0:C8:B1:1F:8D:43:D5:76:67:1C:6E:B2:BC:EA:B4:13:FB:83:D9:65:D0:6D:2F:F2• DigiCert Assured ID Root CA 3E:90:99:B5:01:5E:8F:48:6C:00:BC:EA:9D:11:1E:E7:21:FA:BA:35:5A:89:BC:F1:DF:69:56:1E:3D:C6:32:5C• DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 7D:05:EB:B6:82:33:9F:8C:94:51:EE:09:4E:EB:FE:FA:79:53:A1:14:ED:B2:F4:49:49:45:2F:AB:7D:2F:C1:85• DigiCert Assured ID Root G3 7E:37:CB:8B:4C:47:09:0C:AB:36:55:1B:A6:F4:5D:B8:40:68:0F:BA:16:6A:95:2D:B1:00:71:7F:43:05:3F:C2• DigiCert Global Root CA 43:48:A0:E9:44:4C:78:CB:26:5E:05:8D:5E:89:44:B4:D8:4F:96:62:BD:26:DB:25:7F:89:34:A4:43:C7:01:61• DigiCert Global Root G2 CB:3C:CB:B7:60:31:E5:E0:13:8F:8D:D3:9A:23:F9:DE:47:FF:C3:5E:43:C1:14:4C:EA:27:D4:6A:5A:B1:CB:5F• DigiCert Global Root G3 31:AD:66:48:F8:10:41:38:C7:38:F3:9E:A4:32:01:33:39:3E:3A:18:CC:02:29:6E:F9:7C:2A:C9:EF:67:31:D0• DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA 74:31:E5:F4:C3:C1:CE:46:90:77:4F:0B:61:E0:54:40:88:3B:A9:A0:1E:D0:0B:A6:AB:D7:80:6E:D3:B1:18:CF• DigiCert Trusted Root G4 55:2F:7B:DC:F1:A7:AF:9E:6C:E6:72:01:7F:4F:12:AB:F7:72:40:C7:8E:76:1A:C2:03:D1:D9:D2:0A:C8:99:88• Class 2 Primary CA 0F:99:3C:8A:EF:97:BA:AF:56:87:14:0E:D5:9A:D1:82:1B:B4:AF:AC:F0:AA:9A:58:B5:D5:7A:33:8A:3A:FB:CB eMudhra Inc• emSign ECC Root CA BC:4D:80:9B:15:18:9D:78:DB:3E:1D:8C:F4:F9:72:6A:79:5D:A1:64:3C:A5:F1:35:8E:1D:DB:0E:DC:0D:7E:B3• emSign Root CA - C1 12:56:09:AA:30:1D:A0:A2:49:B9:7A:82:39:CB:6A:34:21:6F:44:DC:AC:9F:39:54:B1:42:92:F2:E8:C8:60:8F eMudhra Technologies Limited• emSign ECC Root CA - G3 86:A1:EC:BA:08:9C:4A:8D:3B:BE:27:34:C6:12:BA:34:1D:81:3E:04:3C:F9:E8:A8:62:CD:5C:57:A3:6B:BE:6B• emSign Root CA - G1 40:F6:AF:03:46:A9:9A:A1:CD:1D:55:5A:4E:9C:CE:62:C7:F9:63:46:03:EE:40:66:15:83:3D:C8:C8:D0:03:67 Entrust• Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1 02:ED:0E:B2:8C:14:DA:45:16:5C:56:67:91:70:0D:64:51:D7:FB:56:F0:B2:AB:1D:3B:8E:B0:70:E5:6E:DF:F5• Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2 43:DF:57:74:B0:3E:7F:EF:5F:E4:0D:93:1A:7B:ED:F1:BB:2E:6B:42:73:8C:4E:6D:38:41:10:3D:3A:A7:F3:39• Entrust. net Certification Authority 2048 6D:C4:71:72:E0:1C:BC:B0:BF:62:58:0D:89:5F:E2:B8:AC:9A:D4:F8:73:80:1E:0C:10:B9:C8:37:D2:1E:B1:77 GlobalSign• GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5 17:9F:BC:14:8A:3D:D0:0F:D2:4E:A1:34:58:CC:43:BF:A7:F5:9C:81:82:D7:83:A5:13:F6:EB:EC:10:0C:89:24• GlobalSign Root CA - R3 CB:B5:22:D7:B7:F1:27:AD:6A:01:13:86:5B:DF:1C:D4:10:2E:7D:07:59:AF:63:5A:7C:F4:72:0D:C9:63:C5:3B• GlobalSign Root CA EB:D4:10:40:E4:BB:3E:C7:42:C9:E3:81:D3:1E:F2:A4:1A:48:B6:68:5C:96:E7:CE:F3:C1:DF:6C:D4:33:1C:99• GlobalSign Root CA - R6 2C:AB:EA:FE:37:D0:6C:A2:2A:BA:73:91:C0:03:3D:25:98:29:52:C4:53:64:73:49:76:3A:3A:B5:AD:6C:CF:69 GoDaddy• Go Daddy Class 2 CA C3:84:6B:F2:4B:9E:93:CA:64:27:4C:0E:C6:7C:1E:CC:5E:02:4F:FC:AC:D2:D7:40:19:35:0E:81:FE:54:6A:E4• Starfield Class 2 CA 14:65:FA:20:53:97:B8:76:FA:A6:F0:A9:95:8E:55:90:E4:0F:CC:7F:AA:4F:B7:C2:C8:67:75:21:FB:5F:B6:58 Google Trust Services GTS• GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R4 BE:C9:49:11:C2:95:56:76:DB:6C:0A:55:09:86:D7:6E:3B:A0:05:66:7C:44:2C:97:62:B4:FB:B7:73:DE:22:8C• Staat der Nederlanden Root CA - G3 3C:4F:B0:B9:5A:B8:B3:00:32:F4:32:B8:6F:53:5F:E1:72:C1:85:D0:FD:39:86:58:37:CF:36:18:7F:A6:F4:28• Staat der Nederlanden Root CA - G2 66:8C:83:94:7D:A6:3B:72:4B:EC:E1:74:3C:31:A0:E6:AE:D0:DB:8E:C5:B3:1B:E3:77:BB:78:4F:91:B6:71:6F HARICA• Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011 BC:10:4F:15:A4:8B:E7:09:DC:A5:42:A7:E1:D4:B9:DF:6F:05:45:27:E8:02:EA:A9:2D:59:54:44:25:8A:FE:71• Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2015 A0:40:92:9A:02:CE:53:B4:AC:F4:F2:FF:C6:98:1C:E4:49:6F:75:5E:6D:45:FE:0B:2A:69:2B:CD:52:52:3F:36• Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015 44:B5:45:AA:8A:25:E6:5A:73:CA:15:DC:27:FC:36:D2:4C:1C:B9:95:3A:06:65:39:B1:15:82:DC:48:7B:48:33 IdenTrust• IdenTrust Commercial Root CA 1 5D:56:49:9B:E4:D2:E0:8B:CF:CA:D0:8A:3E:38:72:3D:50:50:3B:DE:70:69:48:E4:2F:55:60:30:19:E5:28:AE• IdenTrust Public Sector Root CA 1 30:D0:89:5A:9A:44:8A:26:20:91:63:55:22:D1:F5:20:10:B5:86:7A:CA:E1:2C:78:EF:95:8F:D4:F4:38:9F:2F Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S. QuoVadis Root CA 1 G3 8A:86:6F:D1:B2:76:B5:7E:57:8E:92:1C:65:82:8A:2B:ED:58:E9:F2:F2:88:05:41:34:B7:F1:F4:BF:C9:CC:74• QuoVadis Root CA 2 85:A0:DD:7D:D7:20:AD:B7:FF:05:F8:3D:54:2B:20:9D:C7:FF:45:28:F7:D6:77:B1:83:89:FE:A5:E5:C4:9E:86• QuoVadis Root CA 3 18:F1:FC:7F:20:5D:F8:AD:DD:EB:7F:E0:07:DD:57:E3:AF:37:5A:9C:4D:8D:73:54:6B:F4:F1:FE:D1:E1:8D:35• QuoVadis Root CA 3 G3 88:EF:81:DE:20:2E:B0:18:45:2E:43:F8:64:72:5C:EA:5F:BD:1F:C2:D9:D2:05:73:07:09:C5:D8:B8:69:0F:46• QuoVadis Root Certification Authority A4:5E:DE:3B:BB:F0:9C:8A:E1:5C:72:EF:C0:72:68:D6:93:A2:1C:99:6F:D5:1E:67:CA:07:94:60:FD:6D:88:73 SECOM Trust Systems Co. Ltd. SECOM Trust. net - Security Communication RootCA1 E7:5E:72:ED:9F:56:0E:EC:6E:B4:80:00:73:A4:3F:C3:AD:19:19:5A:39:22:82:01:78:95:97:4A:99:02:6B:6C• Security Communication RootCA2 51:3B:2C:EC:B8:10:D4:CD:E5:DD:85:39:1A:DF:C6:C2:DD:60:D8:7B:B7:36:D2:B5:21:48:4A:A4:7A:0E:BE:F6 SSL Corporation• SSL. com Root Certification Authority RSA 85:66:6A:56:2E:E0:BE:5C:E9:25:C1:D8:89:0A:6F:76:A8:7E:C1:6D:4D:7D:5F:29:EA:74:19:CF:20:12:3B:69• SSL. com Root Certification Authority ECC 34:17:BB:06:CC:60:07:DA:1B:96:1C:92:0B:8A:B4:CE:3F:AD:82:0E:4A:A3:0B:9A:CB:C4:A7:4E:BD:CE:BC:65 Swisscom Switzerland Ltd• Swisscom Root CA 2 F0:9B:12:2C:71:14:F4:A0:9B:D4:EA:4F:4A:99:D5:58:B4:6E:4C:25:CD:81:14:0D:29:C0:56:13:91:4C:38:41 SwissSign AG• SwissSign Gold CA - G2 62:DD:0B:E9:B9:F5:0A:16:3E:A0:F8:E7:5C:05:3B:1E:CA:57:EA:55:C8:68:8F:64:7C:68:81:F2:C8:35:7B:95• SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 3B:22:2E:56:67:11:E9:92:30:0D:C0:B1:5A:B9:47:3D:AF:DE:F8:C8:4D:0C:EF:7D:33:17:B4:C1:82:1D:14:36• SwissSign Silver CA - G2 BE:6C:4D:A2:BB:B9:BA:59:B6:F3:93:97:68:37:42:46:C3:C0:05:99:3F:A9:8F:02:0D:1D:ED:BE:D4:8A:81:D5 Symantec• Symantec Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority - G6 CB:62:7D:18:B5:8A:D5:6D:DE:33:1A:30:45:6B:C6:5C:60:1A:4E:9B:18:DE:DC:EA:08:E7:DA:AA:07:81:5F:F0• Symantec Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4 FE:86:3D:08:22:FE:7A:23:53:FA:48:4D:59:24:E8:75:65:6D:3D:C9:FB:58:77:1F:6F:61:6F:9D:57:1B:C5:92• Symantec Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4 36:3F:3C:84:9E:AB:03:B0:A2:A0:F6:36:D7:B8:6D:04:D3:AC:7F:CF:E2:6A:0A:91:21:AB:97:95:F6:E1:76:DF• GeoTrust Global CA FF:85:6A:2D:25:1D:CD:88:D3:66:56:F4:50:12:67:98:CF:AB:AA:DE:40:79:9C:72:2D:E4:D2:B5:DB:36:A7:3A• GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G2 5E:DB:7A:C4:3B:82:A0:6A:87:61:E8:D7:BE:49:79:EB:F2:61:1F:7D:D7:9B:F9:1C:1C:6B:56:6A:21:9E:D7:66• GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3 B4:78:B8:12:25:0D:F8:78:63:5C:2A:A7:EC:7D:15:5E:AA:62:5E:E8:29:16:E2:CD:29:43:61:88:6C:D1:FB:D4• GeoTrust Universal CA A0:45:9B:9F:63:B2:25:59:F5:FA:5D:4C:6D:B3:F9:F7:2F:F1:93:42:03:35:78:F0:73:BF:1D:1B:46:CB:B9:12• VeriSign Class 1 Public PCA - G3 CB:B5:AF:18:5E:94:2A:24:02:F9:EA:CB:C0:ED:5B:B8:76:EE:A3:C1:22:36:23:D0:04:47:E4:F3:BA:55:4B:65• VeriSign Class 2 Public PCA - G3 92:A9:D9:83:3F:E1:94:4D:B3:66:E8:BF:AE:7A:95:B6:48:0C:2D:6C:6C:2A:1B:E6:5D:42:36:B6:08:FC:A1:BB• VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3 EB:04:CF:5E:B1:F3:9A:FA:76:2F:2B:B1:20:F2:96:CB:A5:20:C1:B9:7D:B1:58:95:65:B8:1C:B9:A1:7B:72:44• VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4 69:DD:D7:EA:90:BB:57:C9:3E:13:5D:C8:5E:A6:FC:D5:48:0B:60:32:39:BD:C4:54:FC:75:8B:2A:26:CF:7F:79• VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 9A:CF:AB:7E:43:C8:D8:80:D0:6B:26:2A:94:DE:EE:E4:B4:65:99:89:C3:D0:CA:F1:9B:AF:64:05:E4:1A:B7:DF• VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority 23:99:56:11:27:A5:71:25:DE:8C:EF:EA:61:0D:DF:2F:A0:78:B5:C8:06:7F:4E:82:82:90:BF:B8:60:E8:4B:3C T-Systems International GmbH Deutsche Telekom• Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2 B6:19:1A:50:D0:C3:97:7F:7D:A9:9B:CD:AA:C8:6A:22:7D:AE:B9:67:9E:C7:0B:A3:B0:C9:D9:22:71:C1:70:D3• T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 91:E2:F5:78:8D:58:10:EB:A7:BA:58:73:7D:E1:54:8A:8E:CA:CD:01:45:98:BC:0B:14:3E:04:1B:17:05:25:52 Taiwan-CA Inc. TWCA• TWCA Global Root CA 59:76:90:07:F7:68:5D:0F:CD:50:87:2F:9F:95:D5:75:5A:5B:2B:45:7D:81:F3:69:2B:61:0A:98:67:2F:0E:1B• TWCA Root Certification Authority BF:D8:8F:E1:10:1C:41:AE:3E:80:1B:F8:BE:56:35:0E:E9:BA:D1:A6:B9:BD:51:5E:DC:5C:6D:5B:87:11:AC:44 Telia Company formerly TeliaSonera• Sonera Class2 CA 79:08:B4:03:14:C1:38:10:0B:51:8D:07:35:80:7F:FB:FC:F8:51:8A:00:95:33:71:05:BA:38:6B:15:3D:D9:27• TeliaSonera DD:69:36:FE:21:F8:F0:77:C1:23:A1:A5:21:C1:22:24:F7:22:55:B7:3E:03:A7:26:06:93:E8:A2:4B:0F:A3:89 TrustCor Systems S. de R. TrustCor RootCert CA-2 07:53:E9:40:37:8C:1B:D5:E3:83:6E:39:5D:AE:A5:CB:83:9E:50:46:F1:BD:0E:AE:19:51:CF:10:FE:C7:C9:65• TrustCor ECA-1 5A:88:5D:B1:9C:01:D9:12:C5:75:93:88:93:8C:AF:BB:DF:03:1A:B2:D4:8E:91:EE:15:58:9B:42:97:1D:03:9C• TrustCor RootCert CA-1 D4:0E:9C:86:CD:8F:E4:68:C1:77:69:59:F4:9E:A7:74:FA:54:86:84:B6:C4:06:F3:90:92:61:F4:DC:E2:57:5C Trustis Trustis Limited - Trustis FPS Root CA C1:B4:82:99:AB:A5:20:8F:E9:63:0A:CE:55:CA:68:A0:3E:DA:5A:51:9C:88:02:A0:D3:A6:73:BE:8F:8E:55:7D Trustwave• Secure Global CA 42:00:F5:04:3A:C8:59:0E:BB:52:7D:20:9E:D1:50:30:29:FB:CB:D4:1C:A1:B5:06:EC:27:F1:5A:DE:7D:AC:69• XRamp Global Certification Authority CE:CD:DC:90:50:99:D8:DA:DF:C5:B1:D2:09:B7:37:CB:E2:C1:8C:FB:2C:10:C0:FF:0B:CF:0D:32:86:FC:1A:A2 UniTrust• UCA Global G2 Root9B:EA:11:C9:76:FE:01:47:64:C1:BE:56:A6:F9:14:B5:A5:60:31:7A:BD:99:88:39:33:82:E5:16:1A:A0:49:3C WISeKey• OISTE WISeKey Global Root GA CA 41:C9:23:86:6A:B4:CA:D6:B7:AD:57:80:81:58:2E:02:07:97:A6:CB:DF:4F:FF:78:CE:83:96:B3:89:37:D7:F5• OISTE WISeKey Global Root GB CA 6B:9C:08:E8:6E:B0:F7:67:CF:AD:65:CD:98:B6:21:49:E5:49:4A:67:F5:84:5E:7B:D1:ED:01:9F:27:B8:6B:D6• OISTE WISeKey Global Root GC CA 85:60:F9:1C:36:24:DA:BA:95:70:B5:FE:A0:DB:E3:6F:F1:1A:83:23:BE:94:86:85:4F:B3:F3:4A:55:71:19:8D Updated February 2020.

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DigiCert Root Certificates

08 c6 3a 0c 76 a9 67 f2 d4

Link URL: Only the registered members can see the Link URLs. Please OR. Please, NO collections etc, just NEW metas PLEASE DO NOT ask for missing meta codes! We do not hide them or keep them secret; if they are available, we already share them here! biggerdave Reviewed by biggerdave on 17th May 2020. Please add them here [NO REQUESTS! gpsurl. html Please, NO collections etc, just NEW metas PLEASE DO NOT ask for missing meta codes! We do not hide them or keep them secret; if they are Rating: 5 24th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 17th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 27th June 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 16th June 2020 , 20th June 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 9th June 2020 , 18th May 2020 , 30th May 2020 , 16th June 2020 , 19th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 17th May 2020 ; Africa v1050. 10184 4B F0 A4 7C 2D 6E 16 22 C3 4D D4 A8 4F A2 84 31 Africa-102452. meta ; Africa v1050. 10180 3A DB FB A3 01 4E 54 0A 4A FE C6 45 82 00 D5 72 Africa-102448. meta ; Africa v1050. 10179 27 32 62 32 BC 89 44 EA C1 E6 BC 22 8B 48 5B 5D Africa-102447. meta ; Australia v1050. 10184 4E 61 84 FD FE 29 A5 C7 B0 07 3D 75 F7 F3 4D D1 Australia-102452. meta ; Australia v1050. 10180 79 24 1F 73 1D 00 91 0E B5 83 04 E8 CF 3A B4 F6 Australia-102448. meta ; Australia v1050. 10179 AC 03 5F 55 8E 39 0D 74 43 99 1F 8E E9 E6 42 4F Australia-102447. meta ; Benelux v1050. 10182 E4 3A 48 CA 28 84 18 A7 73 30 0C 9F A2 DF B8 52 Benelux-102450. meta ; Benelux v1050. 10226 3C 53 7F 6E 7E 26 BD 6D 61 D5 F2 50 BC 42 51 24 Benelux-102488. meta ; Benelux v1050. 10180 8E 66 24 9A 1C 13 E0 CF D7 C8 8B B9 DD 5A ED 08 Benelux-102448. meta ; Benelux v1050. 10177 CF 9C 66 39 28 50 60 B4 B0 CB FD DF 26 E1 01 00 Benelux-102445. meta ; Brazil v1050. 10184 CC F2 F0 6E 9B 36 1B 33 FB DB F5 01 79 7A CB DD Brazil-102452. meta ; Brazil v1050. 10180 AE 47 9F FE 16 58 A7 14 91 95 88 14 82 2C AB FD Brazil-102448. meta ; Brazil v1050. 10179 9D 20 C0 F3 C5 B6 78 E0 63 21 86 EF D4 4D 57 88 Brazil-102447. meta ; Canada-Alaska v1050. 10183 B2 D1 C6 DB 3B 0B 0D 38 D4 C1 E6 9D 76 C0 44 BC Canada-Alaska-102451. meta ; Canada-Alaska v1050. 10227 E4 86 48 9D 3B C7 2A 3A D0 DB F0 30 32 36 9C 15 Canada-Alaska-102489. meta ; Canada-Alaska v1050. 10178 05 06 27 1A 4D 05 27 73 4F B9 69 44 A8 CF 3A 14 Canada-Alaska-102446. meta ; Europe v1050. 10181 D8 40 D3 89 D3 F1 FC 93 C1 8B A1 53 4A 30 63 34 Europe-102449. meta ; Europe v1050. 10226 B1 55 CA 66 7B D9 0B B8 19 53 1F FA 10 89 E3 77 Europe-102488. meta ; Europe v1050. 10180 71 30 4D 0E 48 6B 57 5D 5C 2D 8C 10 D5 6A 0B AD Europe-102448. meta ; Europe v1050. 10176 F8 5D 6E 6A A3 C1 D2 36 A7 D0 A9 97 D9 38 F3 F3 Europe-102444. tmeta ; France v1050. 10182 82 67 3A BF 4E 64 BE 75 16 A2 F8 36 F2 D4 F5 69 France-102450. meta ; France v1050. 10226 DE 20 27 64 6D C6 F3 5C 06 E4 49 2E F7 9C 2E 9F France-102488. meta ; France v1050. 10180 A1 E5 E0 35 79 D6 8E 15 B7 B1 9E 37 66 AE 82 93 France-102448. meta ; France v1050. 10177 2D 75 94 35 74 91 0B 11 D9 EC 57 11 9A 6D BF 00 France-102445. meta ; Greece v1050. 10182 65 13 74 A7 56 F2 5E 55 6D C5 CF 18 14 A2 2A 45 Greece-102450. meta ; Greece v1050. 10177 47 EE B5 0B B6 D9 66 9F C9 BA 0A 9B 70 04 AF C9 Greece-102445. meta ; Iberia v1050. 10182 65 A0 91 CD C8 C6 BF 99 51 30 F6 47 3C AB E5 CD Iberia-102450. meta ; Iberia v1050. 10226 7F DA 95 CB 0A 9D 4B 85 52 2E 3F C2 91 D9 55 7A Iberia-102488. meta ; Iberia v1050. 10180 53 9D BA B2 E7 A1 40 C6 FF DC 46 9D 7A D0 2A 08 Iberia-102448. meta ; Iberia v1050. 10177 D7 8E 97 4F F6 EB 51 56 83 2F DC 09 0A 1B 22 70 Iberia-102445. meta ; Italia v1050. 10182 45 DB 26 11 53 71 F0 CC 18 A3 40 85 BC 92 01 2D Italia-102450. meta ; Italia v1050. 10226 1B 7F A4 65 EA F3 98 90 92 BA BB 47 34 53 7B C0 Italia-102488. meta ; Italia v1050. 10180 A8 F5 EC E0 BD BE 3C EF 17 39 BD 55 B3 80 6A 37 Italia-102448. meta ; Italia v1050. 10177 D0 5A 09 01 C2 B7 B3 F6 2F 1D FF 27 49 29 29 25 Italia-102445. meta ; Poland v1050. 10180 32 CF 89 5D 66 95 26 08 28 02 55 CD 09 47 67 B4 Poland-102448. meta ; Poland v1050. 10177 E1 BF D7 05 71 72 B7 10 B7 94 CE A2 15 EC 82 A4 Poland-102445. meta ; Russia v1050. 10177 56 3E 42 9B 18 B6 7E D7 8C A1 AD 03 C3 87 AC 23 Russia-102445. meta ; Scandinavia v1050. 10182 11 08 05 17 78 62 4C 3A DA 27 60 C9 8A E5 B5 DE Scandinavia-102450. meta ; Scandinavia v1050. 10226 45 33 02 92 B1 FF 62 5A 0F 3B 8C A7 52 1A 8D 55 Scandinavia-102488. meta ; Scandinavia v1050. 10180 51 C4 6F A1 60 1F 4B D7 C7 09 11 44 4E F0 6C A1 Scandinavia-102448. meta ; Scandinavia v1050. 10177 86 84 45 D6 4B 57 72 D5 EF 2F E4 D8 A1 F6 43 4A Scandinavia-102445. meta ; Turkey v1050. 10182 B6 7A 4B 3D 6F 79 CC 4C A5 DE 35 9F 7B C1 19 24 Turkey-102450. meta ; Turkey v1050. 10177 5C F9 97 50 91 0F C7 52 C3 7F 88 4B C6 D3 7B 76 Turkey-102445. meta 24th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 24th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 27th June 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 20th June 2020 , 20th June 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 24th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 24th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 17th June 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 4th June 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020• ; Africa v1050. 10188 2F 63 F3 22 31 AB CB AD 04 5C 16 5D 1D C3 12 06 Africa-102456. meta ; Australia v1050. 10188 37 8E 6E 19 4A 9C 85 3D 05 05 28 90 E5 74 E7 C7 Australia-102456. meta ; Benelux v1050. 10186 E0 74 5A 80 13 33 EF 2E 4A 75 2C D3 D3 43 7D 56 Benelux-102454. meta ; Brazil v1050. 10188 98 1E 00 30 71 39 D9 C6 73 BC 1B B0 25 B0 42 A5 Brazil-102456. meta ; Canada-Alaska v1050. 10187 79 32 81 7B 76 D5 50 6E 8D 49 C8 6B DB F8 FD B0 Canada-Alaska-102455. meta ; Europe v1050. 10185 45 5F 7B 68 8E C3 46 20 38 F0 7C C9 31 A9 12 EC Europe-102453. meta ; France v1050. 10186 71 17 49 0A 47 9F EF 48 E2 6B 48 C6 51 60 2C 35 France-102454. meta ; Greece v1050. 10186 4B 18 5A 7C BF 9A 5F 05 16 58 63 79 17 D5 62 8D Greece-102454. meta ; Iberia v1050. 10186 A2 15 81 9E E5 51 B8 1D 70 B8 57 46 1B F4 01 4F Iberia-102454. meta ; Italia v1050. 10186 FD 83 EC 93 1D 95 69 AF 1D D3 D7 83 2E C3 BE CA Italia-102454. meta ; Poland v1050. 10186 41 2C FE D4 0E 00 63 1D 4B 4D 7B 20 E1 3A C9 C4 Poland-102454. meta ; Scandinavia v1050. 10186 50 EA C6 C8 B6 D6 96 F0 6A C6 92 77 68 B2 3A CF Scandinavia-102454. meta ; Taiwan v1050. 10188 7E AB A5 59 BD 4A 72 CB F1 4C AF C0 6B 5C 19 4B Taiwan-102456. meta ; Turkey v1050. 10186 D6 E5 5F A0 13 08 F2 6B 03 9C 91 2D 51 02 5B CC Turkey-102454. meta 24th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 27th June 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 20th June 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 4th June 2020 , 22nd May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020• 24th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 24th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 27th June 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 20th June 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 25th May 2020 , 14th June 2020 , 4th June 2020 , 23rd May 2020 , 23rd May 2020• meta ; Chile v1050. 10184 72 EF B9 60 73 3C 73 A4 C3 4A FD 01 A0 48 94 37 Chile-102452. meta ; Mexico v1050. 10183 AA A0 A8 3E 7A B4 4C 35 F2 48 8A 94 B8 2B 33 48 Mexico-102451. meta ; Morocco v1050. 10184 7A 0A A0 63 1D A4 8C AD 03 74 CF EE 21 CD E4 CE Morocco-102452. meta 27th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 27th June 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 20th June 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 4th June 2020 , 26th May 2020 , 27th May 2020• meta 27th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 27th June 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 20th June 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 17th June 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 4th June 2020 , 27th May 2020 , 27th May 2020• nav3-no-asr ; Europe v1050. 10262 95 96 3D 7A CE 76 89 58 B5 AB F2 E0 47 4E 67 93 Europe-102520. meta 30th May 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 27th June 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 20th June 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 29th May 2020 , 4th June 2020 , 28th May 2020 , 28th May 2020• 30th May 2020 , 30th May 2020 , 30th May 2020 , 27th June 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 31st May 2020 , 31st May 2020 , 31st May 2020 , 30th May 2020 , 31st May 2020 , 31st May 2020 , 21st June 2020 , 31st May 2020 , 1st June 2020 , 8th June 2020 , 4th June 2020 , 30th May 2020 , 30th May 2020•

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